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Since the burst of the financial crisis, it became mandatory to understand the dynamics between 
public debt and GDP. However, the private debt and GDP correlation was overlooked. This 
paper aims to overcome this breach, by exploring the casual relationship between private and 
public debts and economic growth, for a panel of 21 OECD countries between 1995 and 2016. 
The empirical results suggest that an increase in GDP growth, ceteris paribus, affects positively 
the private debt growth whilst lowering public debt growth. Nevertheless, the results are 
somewhat different between countries that participate or not in the European Monetary Union. 
 





Issues on the impact of debt on economic growth soon started to be studied by economists. 
However, before the burst of the global economic crisis in 2008 and the consequent debt crisis 
in European countries, most studies were based on emerging economies with low income levels 
and mainly related to foreign debt (Patillo et al., 2002; Clements et al., 2003; Patillo et al., 
2004; Schclarek, 2004). Moreover, at the time, studies on government debt were mainly 
concerned in proving Ricardian Equivalence1. In particular, for Abbas and Christensen (2007), 
the lack of interest on this relationship was the result of one of the three following aspects: i) 
data unavailability for a substantial part of the countries; ii) public debt considered an 
endogenous variable (as in Ricardian Equivalence theory); and iii) the size of government debt 
has not been, until 2008, assessed as a problem in developed markets. 
Nevertheless, similar issues to the ones presented in this research have been addressed, already, 
in the twentieth century, presenting contradictory results. On the one hand, Modigliani (1961), 
Diamond (1965) and Saint-Paul (1992) concluded that rising public debt invariably contributes 
to lower economic growth. On the other, Patillo et al. (2004), based on 61 developing countries 
between 1969-98, found a nonlinear relationship between debt and economic growth, in which 
low levels of public debt are associated with stronger GDP growth rates while higher levels of 
public debt lead to an economic burden. 
Notwithstanding, the heyday of studies on this matter has occurred in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, not only because of its intensity but also due to the difficulty that countries 
faced in reducing their (still) excessive debt levels. 
                                               
1Ricardian Equivalence states that a government cannot stimulate spending since people assume that the present 
gains will be offset by higher taxes in the future. Therefore, public debt does not have an impact on GDP growth. 
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Laubach (2009), using USA data between 1976 and 2006, concluded that public debt has a 
negative impact on economic growth through enhanced interest rates. This would be referred 
again two years later by Cochrane (2011), who alerted for the increasing probability of the 
occurrence of a sudden fiscal crisis when public debt grows, due to a loss of investors’ 
confidence in government’s ability to pay its liabilities, leading to a sharp rise of interest rates. 
Ferreira (2009), using a VAR model and a Granger-causality relationship between real GDP 
per capita growth and public debt, for 20 OECD countries between 1988-2001, found a cause-
effect relationship: not only that public debt always restricts economic growth, but also that a 
higher real GDP per capita growth rate reduces public debt. Misztal (2010), using a very similar 
methodology for 20 European Union members, between 2000-2010, confirmed that result.  
Kumar and Woo (2010), based on between estimator (BE), fixed effects (FE) and system 
generalized method of moments (SGMM) techniques for a panel of 38 developed and emerging 
countries, found that a 10 percentage points (p.ps.) rise in debt to GDP ratio is associated with 
a decrease of 0.2 p.ps. in annual real per capita GDP growth, with the impact being moderately 
higher in emerging economies. The authors also found evidence of non-linearity between the 
two variables: the higher initial debt level, the greater the negative impact on economic growth. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), in a prominent article and using a threshold model based on data 
for 44 countries between 1970 and 2009, identified the presence of the “U inverted” 
relationship between the two variables. The authors documented that developed or emerging 
economies face a sharply decline in their potential growth when their debt to GDP ratio reaches 
90%. And, despite Herndon et al. (2013) have exposed multiple coding errors in the Reinhart 
and Rogoff study, the same results, even when controlling the impact on inflation and take into 
consideration the level of openness of the economy, would be obtained later by Spilioti (2015) 
for Euro Area countries, using data from 1981-2014. 
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Notwithstanding, there are also some results not entirely consistent with the previous literature. 
Easterly (2001) argues that the causality runs from slow growth to high debt. Abbas and 
Christensen (2007) identified on a sample of 93 low income countries and emerging markets 
between 1975-2004 a positive correlation between public debt and GDP growth. Lof and 
Malinen (2013), using a panel vector autoregressive model, for 20 developed countries, did not 
find evidence that debt impacts economic growth, even when higher levels of public debt are 
considered and finally, Panniza and Presbitero (2014), using an instrumental variable model 
for a sample of OECD countries, have found a negative correlation between public debt and 
growth, but this relationship disappears once endogeneity is corrected by using a variable that 
captures valuation effects caused by the interaction between exchange rate volatility and 
foreign currency.  
The 2008’s financial crisis also sparked research interest in the impact of different sources of 
debt on economic growth, albeit at a lower extend. Incorporating private (household and non-
financial corporations) and public debt is vital in terms of policy insights in order to understand 
the dynamics around episodes of crisis and financial stress. On this regard, Cecchetti et al. 
(2011) on sample of 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 documented that when corporate 
debt goes above 90% of GDP, household debt and government debt separately exceed 85% of 
GDP, then each of one becomes a drag on economic growth.  
Wächter (2012), by summing up all types of debt (households, non-financial corporate and 
government) found that the GDP is maximized for debt to GDP ratios between 200% and 
220%, but short-term economic growth starts to decline for levels over 150%.  
Sutherland et al. (2012) also documented evidence that high private debt levels create 
vulnerabilities and transmit macroeconomic shocks, as households and enterprises lose the 
ability to smooth consumption and investment. Moreover, it was found that during a recession, 
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debt tends to move from the private sector to the government sector. Batini et al. (2015) suggest 
that high private debt rather than high levels government debt is a source of more serious 
problems of macro-fiscal vulnerability, as it leads to sharp declines of economic activity in the 
presence of adverse shocks. The authors also found evidence that excessive delays in 
implementing fiscal austerity raises the likelihood of new fallouts, in particular if interest rates 
are already at the zero lower bound. This second result was confirmed in a latter research of 
Mian, Sufi and Verner (2017), as it was noticed that countries that face these stricter monetary 
policy constraints or that are more reliant on external borrowing, are the ones that observe 
deeper losses when household debt to GDP ratio increases – rather than corporate debt or public 
debt. Moreover, the authors believe the severity of the recent global recession and the 
subsequent high levels of unemployment were somewhat predicted by a global household debt 
cycle. 
This dissertation attempts to provide further insights on this discussion, by including private 
debt (household and non-financial corporations) in the model alongside with public debt. All 
in all, it is hoped that this study will give an understanding of the following questions: (i) if 
there is a relationship between the different forms of debt and economic growth; (ii) what is 
the cause-effect relationship; (iii) whether the impacts are permanent with the strength to 
threaten the sustainability of the country2; (iv) if the relationship alters significantly when time-
fixed effects are accounted for or not; and (v) whether the interest burden is a channel in which 
this dynamic relationships occurs.  
In order to respond to the aforementioned questions, a Panel VAR (PVAR) was computed 
through the GMM estimator for a sample of 21 OECD countries from 1995 to 2016. After 
modelling debt and GDP as a multivariate dynamic process, impulse response plots were 
                                               
2 Namely, whether rising debt threats the ability of a country to continue to grow and pay off its debt.  
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produced to visualize the path of the different types of debt (private and public) and GDP for 
ten years after a shock hits any of these 3 variables. 
The results of this thesis support the view that causality runs from economic growth to debt 
growth, albeit in different directions. In particular, empirical data shows that when controlling 
other factors of growth, an increase of 1 p.ps. in economic growth leads to a decrease of 0.9 
p.ps. in public debt growth. Conversely, the same increase in GDP growth results in a rise of 
1.1 p.ps. in private debt growth. The results also show that the impacts after a shock are only 
temporary, fading with a maximum of seven years. These results do not support, therefore, the 
trends that argue that is mandatory for governments to decrease public debt in order to restore 
the sustainability of the respective country. Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that when the 
sample was reduced to include only countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the 
conclusions were somewhat different. In particular, in this case, data suggest that an increase 
in public debt leads to a slightly smaller economic growth while an increase in GDP does not 
result in a reduction in public debt. Consequently, the immediate implication of this latter 
finding is that countries in the EMU should behave more prudently, as they can easier enter in 
a recessive economic phase.  
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section two provides background 
information on trends of private and public debt. Section three presents the data and the 
estimation model that will be used to estimate properly given the fixed effects and endogeneity 
problems. Section four contains the empirical results and some robustness tests. Finally, section 
five provides concluding remarks and further studies that should be held to really understand 
the dynamism between the variables.  
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2. Trends in aggregate public and private debt  
Since mid-1990s until 2012, advanced economies have observed a strong rise of indebtedness. 
Even though there is no consensus on the specific cause, this growth coincided with deeper 
financial market liberalization – which improved the stability of credit supply (Dynan et al, 
2006) – and with the significant decline in real interest rates (Keen et al, 2010). The most 
prominent theory behind such reduction is the “Global Saving Glut Hypothesis” by Ben 
Bernanke, which argues that this evolution was the consequence of excessive savings compared 
to investment in emerging markets – a preference that derived from a poor social safety net, a 
desire for insurance and ageing populations’ retirement needs.  It is also likely that the rise in 
private debt has been particularly boosted, at least in some countries, by a friendlier tax policy, 
namely through preferential treatment of interests and tax relief mortgage interest payments 
along with explicit subsidies, which have encouraged companies to issue debt and household 
to buy new homes, respectively. 
Figure 1 shows the average aggregate debt on the non-financial sector and its composition 
between 1995 and 2016 of the 21 OECD countries under analysis in this thesis3. Total debt 
combines public and private debt in which public debt corresponds to total government debt 
while private debt combines debt for households and non-financial corporations. According to 
figure 1, total debt as increased remarkably between 1995 and 2012. Starting at 190% of GDP 
in 1995, average total debt rose almost by 90 p.ps. until 2012 being, since then, somewhat flat. 
Until 2009, the upward trend in total debt was the result of increasing private debt (averagea 
growth rate of 3.4% year-on-year). As a result, right before the financial crisis, in 2007, private 
debt accounted for 75% of total debt. Notwithstanding, after the financial crisis hit the 
economies, rises in private debt came to a halt, stabilizing at approximately 190% of GDP, 
                                               
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States 
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while public debt grew exponentially. This latter result was theoretical expected given that 
government revenues are positively linked to business cycles, while public spending is 
expected to be counter-cyclical. 
Figure 1. Average aggregate debt as % of GDP over the sample of countries, 1995-2016 
Source: IMF and BIS 
3. Data and methodology 
This essay uses annual data on 21 OECD countries4 over the period 1995-2016. This choice 
offsets some critiques pointed out to previous studies, by including countries in a stable 
democracy, which pursue similar transparency goals in both fiscal and monetary policies 
(Ogowa, 2016). Moreover, the period under review includes a phase of economic expansion 
(the 1990s and the beginning of century), a financial crisis (2008-2012) and finally, a brief 
period of economic recovery (2013-2016). This sample also allows to check for eventual 
differences in responses to shocks between different subsamples, namely between countries 
that belong or not to the EMU or countries that suffered the most during the crisis, here 
                                               
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States  
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interpreted as the economies that 8 years later had still not recovered to pre-crisis per capita 
GDP levels. 
Data for the key variables such as GDP, population and public debt were obtained from the 
IMF WEO October 2017 database while private debt is from the BIS. Table 1, in the Appendix, 
presents the list of variables along with the respective description and sources, and Table 2 
exhibits the country statistical summary. 
The three main variables under analysis – private debt (P), public debt (G) and GDP (Y) - are 
presented in the logarithms of per capita variables, in real terms, in line with previous research 
(see e.g. Kumar and Woo, 2010 and Lof et al., 2013). However, considering the short period 
under analysis, population growth is not expected to drastically change the results. 
To estimate the casual dynamic relationship between variables and to control for both 
unobserved heterogeneity in fixed effects5 and the endogeneity problem that is likely to exist 
(see Panizza et al., 2012), a Panel VAR (PVAR) model was estimated, using the “difference 
general method of moments” (DGMM) (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
The DGMM estimator uses the first-difference transformation to eliminate country-fixed 
effects6, and combining therefore lagged levels of the dependent and endogenous variables as 
instruments. This is a common operation in the computation of dynamic panel data models, as 
the fixed-effects estimator is generally inconsistent for this type of models (Nickel, 1981). 
To identify the shocks, a recursive structure was considered which makes the ordering of the 
variables relevant. An accepted view is that debt (public and private) boosts aggregate demand 
                                               
5 By using fixed effects, unobserved heterogeneity between countries can be restrained and the impact of debt on 
growth within a specific country can be measured. 
6 For an initial model !",$ = !",$&' + 	*+",$ + ,",$ and defining the full disturbance term as ,",$ = -" + .",$, the 
fixed effect -" drops when transforming the model into first differences ∆!",$ = ∆!",$&' + 	*∆+",$ + ∆.",$ 
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in the short-term but crowds out capital in the long-run, undermining the country’s output (see 
Kumar and Woo, 2010). Not so straightforward is the causal relation between private and 
public debt. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that public debt is affected by governments’ 
decisions to ease private borrowing restraints when private debt is presumably too high (see 
Batini et al., 2015). Therefore, private debt was placed before public debt, followed by GDP. 
As a robustness check, other recursive orders were considered as well, which ended up not 
having substantially different effects on the results. 
All in all, the PVAR model estimated, after applying first-differencing is: 
!",$ = 	*!",$&' + 	0!",$&1 + .",$	, 
in which  !",$ = (∆3",$, ∆4",$, ∆5",$)′,  * and 0 are a 3×3 coefficient matrix and .",$	is a 3×1 
(autocorrelated) residual term. The subscripts ; and < denote country and year, respectively. 
The model includes only two lags, which are selected using the overall coefficient of 
determination (CD), as proposed by Michael and Inessa (2015), and which captures the 
proportion of the total variance that the model reproduces. According to the authors, the lag 
length is chosen merely through minimizing the AIC (Akaike's information criterion), BIC 
(Bayesian information criterion) and MQIC (Hannan-Quinn information criterion) criteria. 
Given that the number of observations declines with the lagged variables included as 
instruments, it was chosen to use the GMM-style instrument as proposed by Holtz-Eakin 
(1988), in which missing values of instrument lags are replaced by zeros. Therefore, the sample 
gets bigger which results in more efficient estimates.  
Finally, it was confirmed that the modulus of each eigenvalue of the estimated model is inferior 
to 1, which means that the model is stable. If this condition did not hold, then there would be 
no long-run equilibrium and the values in the future would just continue to increase, regardless 
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the existence of a shock or not. This is a necessary condition to produce and to obtain accurate 
results from the impulse response function.  
 
4. Results 
According to the results present in table 3 in appendix, there is, in fact, a dynamic relationship 
between private and public debts and GDP. In particular, data available suggests that a positive 
shock in economic growth in the previous period by one unit, ceteris paribus, increases private 
debt in the present by 1.10 percentage points (p.ps.). When private debt is changed by those 
1.10 p.ps., government debt is impacted through this change by -0.12, which, consequently, 
positively affects GDP by 0.04.  
Taking into consideration the magnitude of the impacts after the different shocks, it seems that 
the changes in GDP affect more public debt and private debt (albeit in different directions), 
than the other way around.  
Additionally, the signals of these relationships do not seem surprising as there are fundamentals 
to support them: revenue received by the government evolves positively with economic growth, 
while the Government expenditure tends to decrease when GDP growth increases (via lower 
unemployment subsidies for instance); on the other hand, higher GDP growth is usually related 
with greater levels of job creation which supports households and businesses confidence levels, 
which in turn has a positive effect on private credit demand. 
To understand in more detail the dynamic relationship between the three variables, it is crucial 
to scrutinize the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) derived from the model. An IRF simply 
illustrates how a stable model in equilibrium reacts to a disturbance in any of the included 
regressors and how and for how long it takes to return to the equilibrium after the initial shock. 
In this case, the ceteris paribus condition drops, and the different relationships between the 
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variables are accounted for. The confidence intervals were generated from the simulated 
impulse responses across 1000 Monte Carlo repetitions. 
Figure 2 – Impulse-response functions computed from estimated PVAR (Eq. 1), for 20 
countries over the period 1995-2016. Y-axis measured in %.  
 
Figure 2 presents the impulse-response functions, where it is possible to capture the impact on 
economic growth (first column), public debt (middle column) and private debt (last column) 
for a period of ten years after a positive shock of one standard deviation to either growth (top 
row), public debt (middle row) or private debt (bottom row). Diagonal panels suggest that 
shocks to private debt is momentary, as the impacts fade out within the maximum of two years, 
while shocks to both GDP and public debt, despite being also temporary, are clearly more 
persistent petering out approximately only after seven periods.  
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The remain panels show the reaction on GDP after a shock in public and private debt, the 
impact on public debt after a shock in GDP and private debt, and, finally, the impact on private 
debt after a shock in GDP and public debt.  
According to the second and third panels from the first row, data show evidence that a shock 
in GDP impacts significantly public and private debts, in opposite directions. Nevertheless, 
once again, the effect is only strong in the first couple of years, fading within three years in the 
private debt case, lasting for a bit longer in the case of public debt. 
From the first and third panels from the second row, it seems that a positive shock in public 
debt impacts negatively GDP, while has a positive effect on private debt, although this latter 
impact holds for a minor period of time. Nevertheless, this impact is quite surprising, as it 
would be expected that an increasing public debt would lead to a decreasing private debt. 
Lastly, according to the data, both GDP and public debt react temporarily and positively to 
positive shock in private debt, despite the impact on GDP being only marginal.  
The IRFs support, therefore, the first conclusion in which the impact of a shock in GDP impacts 
in a bigger scale public debt and private debt than the other way around. This analysis shows 
additionally that all impacts are just temporary, fading within a maximum of seven years, 
suggesting that the presence of disturbances does not put the country sustainability on verge. 
 
4.1 Robustness tests 
In an attempt to find whether the conclusions are sensible to some specifications, the model 
was changed to include, in the first phase, time-fixed effects and lastly, different samples of 
countries according to some common characteristics. The results are presented in table 5 of the 
appendix. 
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Model 2 controls the possible presence of heterogeneity between years by including time-fixed-
effects. Given the different phases that the sample includes (from expansion periods to deep 
financial crisis), it was likely that variance of the shocks would vary over time, leading to 
different results. Notwithstanding, the results are not significantly distinctive. The only 
disparity worth to identify is that in the current case, a shock of one unit in private debt in the 
past does not have a statistical effect on GDP, which is clearly against the theory that private 
debt raises economic growth trend. Once again, an increase in public debt leads to an increase 
in private debt, which is not coherent with the response of many governments in rising public 
debt to help the deleverage process of private households after the financial crisis that resulted 
in a sharp fall in private consumption. Therefore, this result shows a painful truth: while public 
debt soared, private-sector deleveraging did not occur as expected. Afterwards, countries end 
up with a higher than ever public debt stocks, which is the type of debt that damages economic 
activity growth. 
In model 3, only the countries that belong to the European Monetary Union (EMU) were 
included, since the common currency came into circulation in 2002 until 2016, while in model 
5 the remaining countries were included. In this case, once again it was not found remarkable 
differences in the results, yet the intensity in which the shock is felt in the two circumstances 
are important findings. In particular, it was uncovered that a shock in public debt in the past 
has an impact in GDP almost five times bigger in the EMU. Conversely, while in the remaining 
countries, a shock of one unit in GDP leads to a reduction of 0.8 p.ps. in public debt, in the 
EMU, the relationship is not even statistically significant. Moreover, when computed the model 
3 taking into account the possibility of heterogeneity between years (results are presented in 
model 4), all relationship between the different variables drop, with exception for the negative 
causality between public debt and GDP. The results point out, thereafter, that the countries with 
no control on their monetary policy have not only increasing challenges to reduce their public 
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debt (and stimulate growth) but their public debt leads, in fact, to lower GDP growth. Hence, 
these countries need to have more prudent behaviours, as they can easily enter in a recessive 
path, having more difficulties to change their course. 
The model 6 used only the countries that did not recover the levels of GDP per capita prior to 
the financial crisis – some of them even had international aid to assure the sustainability of the 
country in the short-term –, but the results are broadly in line with model 1. 
Finally, it was opted to replace in the main model the variables public debt and private debt by 
the interest burden on them. The data was taken from Eurostat, and is available only to 14 out 
of 21 initial countries7. Once again, real per capita variables in logarithms terms were used. 
The purpose of this amendment was to see if the direction of the relationship changed when 
accounting only the effect of interest paid on that debt. The results are presented in table 6. 
The results have altered slightly, but with no big surprises attached. Once again, the relationship 
goes from GDP growth to interest burden growth, but in this case, an increase of GDP growth 
leads to decrease in interest burden in both Private and Public sector. More importantly, this 
result suggests that a reduction in interest burden is the main channel of transmission between 
GDP and public debt – which latter was proven, with the results being on table 7, in appendix.  
Regarding the private sector, since an increase in GDP leads to a reduction in private interest 
burden while increases private debt, it means that there are other factors that more than offset 
the decrease in implicit interest rate. One of this channels is the strong intensification of private 
consumption, as shown in table 8. 
  
                                               
7Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, France, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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5. Conclusions 
Higher levels of indebtedness in developed countries for the last decades and particularly the 
strong acceleration in private debt observed before the financial crisis that followed by an 
enormous accumulation of public debt has resulted in an important debate regarding the 
sustainability of the countries. Following this trend, this paper aimed to provide further insights 
on this matter, by testing the dynamic relationship between private debt, public debt and GDP. 
It was found that increases in GDP growth, when controlling for other determinants of growth, 
affects positively private debt growth while lowers public debt growth, with the results, being, 
however, slightly different between countries that participate or not in the European Monetary 
Union. Particularly, it was found evidence that countries in the EMU have a bigger probability 
of entering in a recessive economic period, as increasing GDP does not result in lower public 
debt but an increase in public debt leads to a weaker GDP growth.  
Finally, it was proved that the negative relationship between GDP and public debt holds even 
when the latter variable is replaced by the public interest burden. In fact, it was evidenced that 
an increase in GDP leads to a reduction in public debt through a lower interest burden, which 
mainly results from decrease interest rates – on this regard, certainly, the Quantitative Easing 
Program of the ECB has great responsibility.  
 
5.1 Future research 
Following the results of this thesis, there is room for future research in order to understand at 
higher extend the dynamics between debt and economic growth. Particularly, public and 
private debt should be replaced by external and domestic debt, to verify whether the links occur 
due to the type of debt or according to its holder. In fact, the lack of historical data in a common 
source for this sample of countries was the only obstacle to that analysis to not being performed 
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on this paper. Through that study it would be possible to understand why analysts and investors 
have significant different opinions regarding countries highly indebted as Italy and Portugal. 
Taking into account the differences in the results between countries that belong to the EMU 
and the remaining economies, it would be useful to test if the results hold when included a 
greater sample of countries throughout more years. If so, it would also be interesting to test at 
what extend the lack of monetary policy damages the country’s authorities capability to 
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Table 1 – Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
∆= Gross domestic 
product per capita in 
constant 2010 USD$ 
The variable is constructed dividing GDP in 
constant 2010 USD$ for the variable “population”, 
from the same source. The variable is logged and 
differentiated. 
AMECO 
∆> Private debt 
(household and 
companies’ debt) per 
capita in constant 
2010 USD$ 
The variable is constructed dividing “Credit to 
Non-financial corporations from all sectors at 
Market value” for the variable population. To put 
the variable in constant terms, the variable "GDP 
deflator" from AMECO is used. The variable is 




∆? Public debt per 
capita in constant 
2010 USD$ 
The variable is computed using the variables 
“Gross government debt as % of GDP”, “GDP at 
current USD$” and “Population”. To put the 
variable in constant terms, the variable "GDP 
deflator" from AMECO is used. The variable is 
logged and differentiated.  
IMF 
∆@3 Private interest 
burden in constant 
2010 USD$ 
The variable is constructed using the variable 
“interest paid” by non-financial corporations and 
households, divided by population. The variable 
was transformed in US Dollars, using the average 
exchange rate available in FRED. To put the 
variable in constant terms, the variable "GDP 
deflator" from AMECO is used. The variable is 





∆@4 Private interest 
burden in constant 
2010 USD$ 
The variable is constructed using the variable 
“interest paid” by General Government, divided by 
population. The variable was transformed in US 
Dollars, using the average exchange rate available 
in FRED. To put the variable in constant terms, the 
variable "GDP deflator" from AMECO is used. The 







constant 2010 USD$ 




Table 2 – Summary Statistics by Country 
 Real GDP per capita Private debt per capita Public debt per capita 
Country Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average 
Australia 37,924.4 55,564.3 47,931.6 36,751.5 112,871.2 72,981.6 4,389.8 19,537.2 9,808.3 
Austria 36,427.9 47,964.2 44,096.0 35,764.5 74,079.3 55,044.1 19,039.1 41,486.2 29,720.0 
Belgium 35,288.5 45,618.4 42,028.0 35,317.5 94,613.3 65,671.6 29,481.1 48,228.0 40,552.7 
Canada 37,635.8 50,679.1 45,651.1 40,903.3 94,819.9 66,081.3 23,578.9 42,684.9 31,564.6 
Denmark 49,154.6 61,190.7 56,918.3 63,006.7 165,003.4 110,109.2 17,328.9 35,329.9 23,893.8 
Finland 31,996.9 49,363.7 42,894.2 32,381.2 84,297.2 58,579.8 11,479.1 27,377.6 18,645.8 
France 34,169.2 42,155.1 39,473.8 35,491.7 75,040.9 55,320.4 15,857.2 40,863.1 27,373.0 
Germany 34,940.9 45,650.8 40,536.5 33,515.4 55,317.2 43,900.3 15,218.1 36,499.6 25,162.6 
Greece 19,909.5 30,054.8 24,624.3 7,175.4 36,215.9 20,890.3 17,307.4 44,216.2 28,866.4 
Ireland 28,772.7 67,588.3 47,275.5 24,224.4 172,942.1 97,855.5 10,120.1 57,503.5 26,883.8 
Italy 32,829.9 38,009.7 35,399.3 19,117.4 48,092.5 33,033.9 26,068.7 44,451.4 36,303.5 
Japan 40,326.6 47,672.7 43,835.4 52,610.7 83,581.0 63,873.9 32,529.3 117,918.1 66,851.2 
Netherlands 38,436.1 52,135.8 47,558.5 56,359.5 130,254.1 95,087.6 15,394.1 34,434.9 25,383.9 
New Zealand 83,635.2 102,530.9 96,916.4 24,546.8 69,559.3 49,137.1 4,206.7 12,102.5 7,473.6 
Norway 22,588.9 33,019.2 28,378.0 87,337.8 211,351.8 147,314.6 14,427.9 46,341.9 27,109.2 
Portugal 18,080.5 22,829.8 21,405.7 16,841.0 52,236.1 35,306.7 7,552.3 28,215.4 16,169.6 
Spain 23,690.0 32,453.3 29,249.2 17,074.4 74,130.4 44,368.9 10,741.1 29,740.4 16,963.4 
Sweden 37,687.0 56,205.7 48,350.0 47,202.3 136,721.6 87,815.2 16,320.3 28,409.4 21,797.1 
Switzerland 60,855.9 76,116.8 69,887.1 73,347.4 182,706.9 121,877.1 22,284.0 39,130.3 31,402.8 
U.K. 30,596.6 41,644.4 37,511.3 34,886.2 93,723.0 62,179.3 11,629.7 38,146.2 22,242.4 
U.S.A. 38,632.7 52,152.4 46,824.3 46,317.8 83,654.4 68,677.4 23,864.4 56,040.3 36,361.6 
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Table 3 – Regression results for the first model  
Final GMM Criterion Q(b)= 0.000 Nº of observations:399 Nº of panels: 21 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
∆"       
∆" L1. 0.0242385  0.0643033  0.38    0.706      -0.1017937 0.1502706 
∆# L1.  0.3887471 0.0686298      5.66    0.000     0.2542352 0.523259 
∆$ L1.  1.107942 0.3101401      3.57 0.000      0.5000788     1.715806 
∆#        
∆" L1. -0.1187902 0.0664202 -1.79    0.074 -0.2489714     0.0113911 
∆# L1.  0.4874378 0.0650122      7.50    0.000      0.3600163 0.6148594 
∆$ L1.  -0.8532538    0.2731261     -3.12    0.002     -1.388571 -0.3179366 
∆$        
∆" L1. 0.0343509  0.0117584      2.92    0.003      0.0113048     0.0573971 
∆# L1.  -0.0455315 0.0146682     -3.10 0.002         -0.0742808     -0.0167823 
∆$ L1.  0.5126669    0.0665225 7.71   0.000      0.3822852 0.6430485 
Instruments : l(1/2).(	∆"	∆#	∆$) 
 
 
Table 5 – Regressions results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
∆"       
∆" L1. 0.0242  -0.0229 0.2039** 0.4402* -0.0420 0.1465*** 
∆# L1.  0.3887* 0.1797** 0.3960* -0.0269 0.4039* 0.4482* 
∆$ L1.  1.1079* 0.8537* 1.3743* 0.2261 0.9435*** 1.1800* 
∆#        
∆" L1. -0.1188*** -0.1650** 0.0601 0.3195 -0.2875* -0.0054 
∆# L1.  0.4874* 0.3828* 0.4700* 0.4669* 0.6201* 0.4099* 
∆$ L1.  -0.8533*    -0.7783** -0.0747 -0.3025 -0.7935*** -0.6467*** 
∆$        
∆" L1. 0.0344*  -0.0079 0.0702* -0.0306 0.0380* 0.0556* 
∆# L1.  -0.0455* -0.0183*** -0.1030* -0.1008* -0.0193*** -0.0720* 
∆$ L1.  0.5127*    0.5668* 0.4033* 0.5902* 0.3933* 0.5667* 
Lag number 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Time Fixed 
Effects No Yes No Yes No No 
Model 1: model that includes all 21 countries between 1995 and 2016.  
Model 2: similar to Model 1, but includes Time Fixed Effects. 
Model 3: model that includes only the countries that belong to the European Monetary Union (EMU), between 
2001 and 2016: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. 
Model 4: similar to Model 3, but includes Time Fixed Effects. 
Model 5: model that includes the countries that do not belong to the EMU, between 1995 and 2016: Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
Model 6: model that only includes countries which did recovered yet the level of real GDP per capita registered 
before the financial crisis: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 





Table 6 – Regressions results of model 
with public and private tax burden and 
GDP 
 Model 6 
 Coefficient 
∆&"  
∆&" L1. 1.5016* 
∆&# L1.  0.1798 
∆$ L1.  -2.1179*** 
∆&#   
∆&" L1. 0.2302* 
∆&# L1.  0.0610 
∆$ L1.  -1.4335**  
∆$   
∆&" L1. 0.0028  
∆&# L1.  0.0209 
∆$ L1.  0.3748*  
Lag number 1 
Model 7: model that includes the variables 
private tax burden, public tax burden and 
GDP, for 14 European countries between 
1999 and 2016. 
 
Table 7 – Regressions results of the casual 
relationship between public interest 
burden, public debt and GDP 
 Model 7 
 Coefficient 
∆&#  
∆&# L1. -0.0768 
∆#' L1.  0.5110* 
∆$ L1.  -1.8783* 
∆#'   
∆&# L1. -0.1619**  
∆#' L1.  0.4910* 
∆$ L1.  -0.5910  
∆$   
∆&# L1. 0.02498  
∆#' L1.  -0.0298*** 
∆$ L1.  0.1977*  
Lag number 2 
Model 8: model that includes the variables 
public tax burden, public debt and GDP, for 





Table 8 – Regressions results of model with private consumption and private debt 
 Model 8 
 Coefficient 
∆"'  
∆"D L1. 0.2532* 
∆(" L1.  1.1169* 
∆("   
∆"D L1. 0.0149 
∆(" L1.  0.7064* 
Lag number 2 
Model 9: model that includes the variables private 
tax burden, public tax burden and GDP, for 14 
European countries between 1999 and 2016. 
